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ABSTRACT
We explore the impact of the institutional environment on the nature of entrepreneurial activity
across Europe. Political, legal, and regulatory variables that have been shown to impact capital
market development influence entrepreneurial activity in the emerging markets of Europe, but not
in the more mature economies of Europe. Greater fairness and greater protection of property rights
increase entry rates, reduce exit rates, and lower average firm size. Additionally, these same factors
also associated with increased industrial vintage  n a size-weighted measure of age  n and reduced
skewness in firm-size distributions. The results suggest that capital constraints induced by these
institutional factors impact both entry and the ability of firms to transition and grow, particularly in
lesser-developed markets.
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  The factors that foster the creation and growth of new enterprises remain of central 
interest to scholars and policy-makers.  New enterprises are considered vital to economic 
growth and are increasingly important laboratories for scholars interested in settings where 
a variety of market frictions – informational asymmetry, moral hazard, and liquidity 
constraints, for example – are most amplified.  At the same time, renewed interest in how 
differing institutional environments impact the functioning of capital markets and the 
investment behavior of firms has drawn attention to how economic institutions vary around 
the world and how they influence economic growth and firm behavior. 
  In this paper, we integrate these literatures by analyzing how institutional 
environments impact the entrepreneurial environment.  In doing so, we analyze a variety of 
measures of entrepreneurial activity including traditional measures such as rates of entry, 
rates of exit, and average firm size as well as more comprehensive measures such as 
industrial vintage and the skewness of firm-size distributions.  These measures of 
entrepreneurial activity are analyzed throughout Europe by exploiting a comprehensive 
database of firms that includes a variety of private, smaller firms.  The European sample 
allows us to analyze a setting where there exists rich institutional variation (both between 
Western and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and amongst countries in those regions) 
and where comparable data is also available.  Employing industry fixed effects in this 
setting further allows us to control for factors associated with distinctive industrial patterns 
across Europe.   The results in the paper suggest that the institutional environment plays an 
important role in shaping the nature of industrial activity and, particularly, the dynamics of 
new enterprises.  Specifically, greater fairness and protection of property rights is shown to 
increase rates of entry, decrease rates of exit, and lower average firm size.  These effects, 
however, are not equally pronounced in all parts of Europe.  The CEE region is 
characterized by particular sensitivity to institutional factors suggesting that these effects 
may be second-order in more mature, developed economies.    
Industrial vintage and the skewness of firm-size distributions are also influenced by 
the institutional variables.  In contrast to the results on average firm size, vintage (a size-
weighted measure of age) increases with greater fairness, with particularly strong 
relationships in the CEE.  In conjunction with the results on size, entry and exit, these 
results suggest that greater fairness alters not only firm starts but also their ability to 
graduate into older, larger enterprisess.  Greater fairness appears to reduce firm size but 
increase vintage, suggesting that fairness both makes it easier to start firms, but also makes 
it easier for firms to graduate into older, larger firms.   
We also examine the skewness of firm size distributions across the CEE and 
Western Europe.  Both the overall level of skewness and the relative skewness of firm-size 
distributions for younger firms appear to be a function of fairness and protection of 
property rights with particularly amplified effects in the CEE.  These results are consistent 
with capital constraints leading to skewness in firm-size distributions, with the relative 
importance of these factors being greater in emerging markets.  Institutional factors 
influence both firm entry and growth at later points.   
  2The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 links this paper to the relevant literatures 
on financial constraints, the nature of entrepreneurial activity, and the cross-country 
variation in institutions.  Section 3 motivates the empirical approach and describes the 
various variables employed in the subsequent analysis.  Section 4 presents the analysis of 
institutional variables on the various characterizations of entrepreneurial activity.  Section 
5 is the conclusion.        
2.  Motivation and Research Design 
Our examination of how institutional conditions determine the pattern of industrial 
activity draws on the existing literatures on financial constraints, the nature of 
entrepreneurial activity, and the new institutional economics literature.  This section briefly 
reviews these works. 
2.1.  Financial Constraints Literature 
The examination of financial constraints has been an important topic within 
corporate finance.  Models such as Myers (1977), Townsend (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), and Myers and Majluf (1984) point to factors in the financial markets that may 
limit a firm’s ability to raise outside capital.  This inability to raise capital may stem from 
information gaps or an inability to contract on the outcomes of a venture.  In this 
environment, good projects may find it impossible to get financing on reasonable terms.  
Positive net present value projects may, in this setting, be forgone.  These works also 
demonstrates that firms prefer to finance investment with internal funds because it is less 
costly than external funds.  Graham and Harvey (2001) show that this type of pecking 
  3order appears to figure largely in the minds of chief financial officers when they arrive at 
investment decisions. 
Early empirical work on financial constraints explored the investment behavior of 
firms and its sensitivity to changes in internally generated funds.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1988) found that firms with low or no dividend payout ratios were more likely to 
have investment that was sensitive to changes in free cash flow.  The authors interpret their 
results as demonstrating that capital constraints likely affect companies that do not pay 
dividends as they forego investment when internal cash is not available.  Costly external 
finance has been explored in multi-divisional firms and has been shown to play an 
important role as well.  Lamont (1997) looks at companies that have oil related production 
and non-oil related businesses.  He finds that investment in the non-oil related businesses 
are dramatically affected by swings in the world price of oil.  This is true despite the fact 
that the firm’s non-oil businesses were largely uncorrelated with the prospects for their oil 
businesses.  Similarly, Shin and Stulz (1998) show that the investment in minor divisions 
of multi-segment firms is affected by the operating performance of the larger divisions 
even if the investment opportunity sets in each division are unrelated to each other. 
Other types of investment activity have also been explored in the literature on 
capital rationing.  Fazzari and Petersen (1993) find that low dividend payout firms have 
higher sensitivities of working capital investment to cash flow.  Similarly, Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994) show that small manufacturing firms have R&D spending that is 
highly dependent upon operating cash flow.  The research on capital rationing has been 
extended to other countries as well.  Hoshi, Kayshap, and Scharfstein (1991) find that 
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than are member firms in which member banks can provide credit.  Devereux and 
Schiatarelli (1990) find a similar pattern for small firms in the United Kingdom.  Small 
firms have investment-cash flow sensitivities that are greater than large firms.  While most 
of this work has been done in developed markets, capital constraints are perhaps even more 
likely in developing and transition economies. 
2.2.    Entrepreneurial Activity Research 
Entrepreneurial activity has received considerable attention in the economics 
literature.  The empirical work on the determinants of entrepreneurial activity is largely 
focused on two streams of research.  One body of work examines patterns of entry and 
exit.  The other stream focuses on the dynamics of firm growth.  Our research effort 
utilizes insights from both these streams of literature and combines the insights from work 
on the importance of capital constraints discussed above.  Given the nature of information 
and uncertainty for entrepreneurial entities, new ventures have the potential for the greatest 
asymmetric information and the largest restrictions on their access to capital. 
A large body of industrial organization work has explored the dynamics of firm 
entry and exit.  In a series of papers, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, 1989) 
examine the changing participants in four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries, highlighting 
the heterogeneity of the rate of exit and entry across industries and the evolution of these 
rates over time.  These papers document the rapid pace of entry during the early phases of 
a particular industry and that these rapid entry rates are also associated with rapid exit 
rates.  
  5Another set of studies has focused on individuals’ transitions into self-employment 
(e.g., Evans and Leighton (1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a, 1994b)), with 
particular emphasis on the influence of capital constraints on these decisions.  These papers 
show that the availability of personal capital is positively related to an individual’s choice 
to become an entrepreneur.  In addition, they show that entrepreneurs who have greater 
“exogenous” resources (via an inheritance, for example) are more likely to survive.  The 
authors interpret these results as implying that credit constraints are a critical factor in both 
the founding and survival of new firms. 
A third area of the entry and exit literature, most closely associated with Steven 
Klepper (e.g., Klepper and Graddy (1990), Klepper and Simons (2000)), has examined the 
empirical regularities associated with the changes in the number of firms active in an 
industry over time.  Over time the number of firms increases, reaches a peak, and then 
declines as the industry consolidates.  Most of this research does not examine the 
foundations of entry and exit rates across various industries or markets, rather explores the 
time series changes within an industry over time.  The results point to the importance of 
controlling for industry in any examination of entry and exit.  Country-level entry and exit 
rates may vary considerably, but much of this variation could be due to the cross sectional 
composition of industries active in those markets. 
A second theme of entrepreneurial research examines the determinants of firm 
growth.  Much of this literature has centered on the question of whether Gibrat’s law 
holds: i.e., the proposition that firm growth is independent of firm size.  As Sutton (1997) 
details, this proposition is equivalent to firm-size distributions being approximately 
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quite positive about the possibility of such a relationship, later work with more detailed 
data sets has taken a more skeptical view.  A variety of studies, including Evans (1987), 
Hall (1987), and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), show that growth rates and size 
are inversely related. 
These works have inspired a number of theorists to develop depictions of the 
evolution of industry dynamics.  In models such as Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and Ericson and Pakes (1995), the basic empirical 
patterns are explained through such factors as gradual learning by entrepreneurs and/or 
firms about their own ability and the nature of technological innovation in emerging 
industries.  
More recently, capital constraints have been offered as an explanation for the 
pattern in the size distribution of firms and the relation between size and growth.  Cooley 
and Quadrini (2003) examine violations of Gibrat’s law.  They develop a model of 
financial frictions and investment. They are able to show that capital constraints can 
potentially explain why small firms pay lower dividends, are more highly levered, have 
higher Tobin’s q, invest more, and have investments that are more sensitive to cash flows. 
Cabral and Mata (2003) develop a model of firm growth that depends upon 
investments and access to capital.  Their model predicts that in the presence of capital 
constraints, the firm size distribution will be skewed.  As capital constraints worsen, firm-
size distributions will become more skewed.  The intuition behind their result is that small 
firms with good investment opportunities may be periodically unable to raise the resources 
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larger firms with internal cash flow to fund their projects.  They argue that the distribution 
of firm size will be more highly skewed for younger firms because they are more likely to 
be capital rationed.  Cabral and Mata then explore the firm size distribution in a sample of 
Portuguese manufacturing firms.  They find that the distribution of firm size is indeed 
skewed and that the skewness is greater for younger firms. 
Surprisingly few studies have sought to examine the patterns across nations in 
industry structure.  Many of these studies (e.g., Johnson and Loveman (1995)) have faced 
challenges due to the limited number of industries and nations for which consistent data 
could be found.  Moreover, many of these studies have been focused on finding common 
trends rather than explaining the diversity of patterns.  There are, however, some 
interesting recent exceptions.  Davis and Henrekson (1999) employ micro-data from the 
U.S. and Sweden.  Another recent exception is Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999), who 
look at average firm size and the dispersion in firm size across industries in 15 European 
nations.  In particular, they explore the role that legal environment plays on firm size in 
capital intensive and non-capital intensive industries.     
2.3.   Research on Legal and Institutional Regimes 
Our paper also draws upon the legal and institutional framework of recent papers in 
the field of law and economics.  Much of this work has focused on the role that the 
institutional and legal regimes play on the development and functioning of capital markets. 
In particular, work by La Porta, et al. (1998, 2000) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) has examined legal and institutional factors that influence the breadth and 
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functioning legal environments promote greater development of financial markets.  In 
addition, the legal and institutional factors and the overall level of capital market 
development, in turn, have been shown to influence aggregate economic outcomes as in 
King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998).  The presumed channel for the impact of these variables is through the failure to 
allocate capital to firms with worthy investment opportunities as a consequence of the 
design of legal rules.  Capital constraints are more likely to affect younger, more 
entrepreneurial firms in these environments. 
In a related literature, the nature of property rights and the prevalence of corruption 
have been shown to influence the nature of investment and overall level of economic 
growth as in Knack and Keefer (1995).  Studies at the micro level have been more limited, 
but Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Shleifer (1997), for example, show how variations in 
guarantees for property rights protection vary within formerly Communist countries and 
how this variation results in differing levels of entrepreneurial investment.  As noted in the 
survey evidence provided in Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002), the nature of 
property rights and the presence of external finance are distinct channels for how 
institutional variables impact economic outcomes.  Again, these effects are likely to be 
more pronounced in developing and transition economies.   
3. Empirical  Framework 
Our paper examines the role of capital constraints on entrepreneurial activity across 
33 European countries.  We look at the effect of country-level variation in economic, legal, 
  9and institutional variables on a variety of measures of the importance of entrepreneurial 
firm dynamics.  These variables have been shown to have important effects on the 
development and functioning of capital markets.  Our approach is to examine a variety of 
measures that provide insights into various dimensions of new firm activity.  In particular, 
our unit of observation is at the country/industry level.  Analyzing the determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity across Europe at the country/industry level holds the promise of 
controlling for industrial heterogeneity in a setting where technologies are relatively 
homogenous yet where there is variation in institutional regimes and there is a sharp 
difference in the stage of development between Western Europe and Central and Eastern 
Europe.     
3.1.  Measures of Entrepreneurial Activity 
  For each industry within a country, we calculate the entry and exit rate, the average 
firm size, the industrial vintage (a weighed-average measure of firm age discussed in detail 
below), and the skewness of the firm size distribution.  In this section, we first discuss the 
dependent variables in our analysis and then describe the set of control variables that we 
employ. 
3.1.1.   Firm Entry and Exit 
  Firm entry and exit are important measures of entrepreneurial activity.  Markets 
that provide an opportunity for greater numbers of startup firms are said to be more 
dynamic and entrepreneurial.  Similarly, the rate at which firms die measures both the 
competitive nature of the local market and the potential advantage that incumbents have.  
  10We measure entry relative to the number of firms existing in the prior year.  Our measure 
of entry is the number of firms that enter our sample in 1998 that were not in the sample in 
1997 divided by the total number of firms that existed in 1997 in the country/industry pair.  
Similarly, we calculate the exit rate as the number of firms that were in our sample in 
1997, but were not in 1998, divided by the total number of firms in that country/industry 
pair in 1997. 
  We expect that if capital constraints influence the entry decision, then more 
developed capital markets will provide greater access to capital and hence have greater 
entry rates.  Institutional and legal variables associated with capital market development 
should be positively related to entry rates.  Similarly, the literature on startup survival 
shows that reductions in capital constraints improve firm survival.  We therefore would 
expect that political and legal variables associated with greater capital market development 
would lead to a lower exit rate. 
3.1.2.   Average Firm Size 
  Because of the role small firms play in an economy, we also look at average firm 
size.  While this measure does not distinguish between small, old firms and small, young 
firms, it does measure whether the local economic environment supports a large number of 
small firms.  Within each country/industry pair, we calculate the average firm size as 
measured by number of employees.  While the prediction is not unambiguous, we might 
expect that lower levels of capital rationing would lead to greater number of small firms 
that can enter and survive in the market.  Hence, average firm size would be expected to be 
smaller in markets with better economic institutions. 
  113.1.3.   Industrial Vintage 
In addition to the more traditional measures discussed above, we are also interested 
in the importance of entrepreneurial firms for overall economic activity.  In order to 
capture the importance of younger firms to industrial activity, we construct a measure of 
industrial vintage.  Vintage is constructed within each country/industry pair and is the 
weighted average age of the firms in each industry where the weights are given by 
turnover, assets, or employees.  In essence, this measure shows how important young firms 
are to the productive capacity of an industry.  A high average vintage would imply that 
most of the productive capacity is produced by relatively older firms in the economy.  On 
the other hand, a low vintage would indicate that young firms dominate the productive 
capacity.  While the results are not sensitive to the choice of weights, we emphasize 
weighting by employees given the ability of this measure to obviate any accounting 
differences across countries.   
How is vintage distinct from average firm size and why might these two measures 
of industrial activity diverge in their response to institutional factors?  In particular, given 
that we expect younger firms to be smaller, won’t economies or industries that are on 
average smaller also have a younger vintage?  The distinction between the two measures 





























  12In this notation, i indexes firms within a given country industry-pair, Si is a measure of 
firm size (in this case the number of employees) and Agei is the age of that firm.  In order 
to see how capital constraints might give rise to distinct effects on size and vintage, it is 
useful to recast these measures in a setting where there are two cohorts of firms denoted as 
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where  N  is the number of old or young firms, S  is the average size of firms in each 
cohort and Age is just the respective age of the two cohorts.  In this setting,  oo N S is the 
employment in the old sector and  yy N S is employment in the young sector.  For the 
moment, assume that o SS > y .     
To see the intuition behind how these measures may diverge, note that if, for 
example,  o N increases and  o S  decreases such that the product,  oo N S , is constant (i.e., they 
exactly offset each other, so employment in the old sector does not change), then vintage 
will not have changed while average size will be smaller.  More generally, it is useful to 
consider examples where these two measures move in opposite directions.   As an 
example, consider situations where vintage rises and average size decreases.  This can arise 
for at least two reasons:   
i) If  o S  goes down and  o N  goes up by more than enough to ensure that population 
shifts to the old sector ( oo SS ′ < , oo N N ′ >  so that oo o o N SN S ′′ > ) then vintage will 
increase and average size will decrease. 
  13ii) If  y S  goes down and  y N  does not go up enough so that population in the young 
sector shrinks ( y S ′ < y S  and  y N  is kept at levels so that yy y y N SN S ′′ < ) then 
vintage will increase and average size will decrease.  
As this example makes clear, average size simply measures the average size of firms and 
vintage provides a broader measure of where the mass of industrial activity is.  Institutional 
variables need not have similar effects on these two characterizations of activity. 
Specifically, if lower capital constraints make it easier to get external financing at 
earlier stages, the young sector would be smaller on average.  At the same time, if firms are 
able to graduate to being older, larger firms faster (or do not exit or fail as much) the 
fraction of actual employment in the young sector could be lower.  If institutional variables 
change firm growth patterns in this way, average firm size would be lower and vintage 
would be higher.  The actual effect of capital constraints on these patterns is, consequently, 
an empirical question.       
3.1.4.   Firm Size Distributions and Skewness 
  While vintage provides a fuller characterization of the importance of younger firms 
to economies than firm size, the fullest characterization of industrial activity is likely a 
firm size distribution and age-specific firm-size distributions.  As discussed above, studies 
of firm-size distributions have tended to be industry specific or country specific.  In this 
paper, we examine the nature of overall and age-specific firm size distributions at the 
regional, country, and country-industry level.     
  14  Specifically, we examine if the skewness of firm-size distributions is related to the 
presence of institutional determinants of capital constraints.  Additionally, to the degree 
that skewness of overall firm-size distributions might be associated with other factors, it is 
useful to consider the relative skewness of the younger firm-size distributions.  If capital 
constraints are operative in shaping the nature of industrial activity, we would expect 
overall firm-size distribution and, especially the firm size distribution of the younger 
cohorts, to be skewed.     
3.2.   Control Variables 
The level of economic development is likely to affect the attractiveness of 
becoming an entrepreneur.  Greater gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is likely to 
provide a larger market potential and greater infrastructure for start-ups. In our analysis, 
GDP per capita is measured by purchasing power parity for residents at the national level.  
If the level of economic development plays a role in supporting entrepreneurial activity, 
then we might expect that GDP per capita to have a positive effect on the ability of 
individuals to successfully become entrepreneurs. 
We also include several political and legal variables when available for both 
Western Europe as well as Central and Eastern Europe.  As the previous literature has 
shown, corruption can play a role in corporate activity.  Corruption is defined broadly as 
“the misuse of public power for private benefits, e.g., bribing of public officials, kickbacks 
in public procurement, or embezzlement of public funds.” Our fairness/corruption index is 
tabulated by Transparency International and is utilized in Djankov et al. (2000).  The index 
averages the corruption scores given by the following sources: (1) Freedom House Nations 
  15in Transit; (2) Gallup International; (3) the Economist Intelligence Unit, (4) the Institute 
for Management Development, Lausanne; (5) the International Crime Victim Survey; (6) 
the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong; (7) The Wall Street Journal’s 
Central European Economic Review; (8) the World Bank and the University of Basel; (9) 
the World Economic Forum.  The index is coded on a ten point descending scale from 1 
(most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).   
The second institutional measure that we utilize is protection of property rights.  A 
large economics literature has explored the role that property rights play on the ability to 
attract capital and ownership structures.  From the perspective of an entrepreneur, strong 
property rights may serve two roles.  First, strong property rights might allow older 
companies to prevent entrepreneurs from starting their own ventures.  Alternatively, strong 
property rights might give young startups an advantage as they compete against established 
companies. Our measure of protection of property rights is taken from World Economic 
Forum’s “The Global Competitiveness Report 2000,” and are defined on a seven point 
scale, with one denoting nations where property rights are not clearly delineated nor are 
strongly protected by law and seven indicating cases where property rights are clearly 
delineated and strongly protected. 
We examine the functioning of the legal system in each country through a measure 
called the Formalism Index.  The index, cited in Djankov, et al. (2002), measures 
substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial 
courts, and is formed by adding up the following indices: (1) professionals vs. laymen, (2) 
written vs. oral elements, (3) legal justification, (4) statutory regulation of evidence, (5) 
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actions. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or 
intervention in the judicial process.   
As discussed above, a number of papers have examined how well the legal system 
functions.  In particular, we look at an index of Interference of Courts that was tabulated by 
the Survey of World Business Environment from the World Bank Group between 1998 and 
2000.  This variable captures whether the courts are fair and impartial.  The index ranges 
from 1 to 6, where 1 means always fair and impartial and 6 never.  One might expect that 
the legal system would be important for protecting new entrants that may be exploited by 
larger, existing companies.  Finally, we include a measure of the procedural burden 
associated with initiating an enterprise.  As developed in Djankov, et al. (2000), the paper 
employs the number of procedures that a start-up firm must undertake before it can operate 
legally.       
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The core data used in this paper are the Amadeus data on corporate activity across 
Europe.  Amadeus is a panel dataset of both public and private companies throughout both 
Eastern and Western Europe.  In particular, the dataset covers nearly four million 
companies in 33 European countries (including all the EU countries) and contains a variety 
of financial and ownership details.   
The original data was provided by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD), a European electronic 
publishing firm.  It specializes in cleaning and organizing data supplied by information 
  17providers in various countries to create a broader data set.  BvD gathers the national data 
through information providers of Amadeus data within each country (e.g., Companies 
House in the UK, Kamers van Koophandel in the Netherlands, INPI in France, National 
Bank of Belgium).  These national companies collect the data from the national public 
body in charge of collecting the annual accounts in its country.  In some countries, 
particularly those in Central Eastern Europe, the information provider collects the data 
directly from the companies because of the difficulty obtaining the data from government 
sources as well as the relative unreliability of the government collected data. 
Because of different disclosure requirements, the amount and type of information 
varies among countries.  For instance, some countries have more data on income statement 
items than on balance sheet items, while firms in other countries have more balance sheet 
information than income statement information.  The completeness of the data also varies: 
for instance, German regulations are more flexible for small and median enterprises and 
failure to disclose is not a punishable offence.  Appendix A lists the providers of data for 
the Amadeus Database. 
This sample construction method poses a challenge for our analysis.  In particular, 
it is likely that our computations of exit and entry rates, as well as of mean and median 
firm size, will be affected by the inclusiveness with which the national statistical agency in 
a particular country collects information.  The thoroughness with which these data is 
collected may vary systematically with other national characteristics that we employ as 
right-hand side variables in the regressions below.  This issue is particularly a concern for 
  18Western European nations, as the Amadeus data compilers rely exclusively on government 
databases in those countries.   
We address this concern in three ways.  First, as discussed above, we employ a 
variety of dependent variables, rather than simply relying on a single measure.   Second, 
the regression analysis employs industry fixed effects to ensure that within industry 
variation is emphasized, to counter any selection bias based on varying rules for industry 
inclusion.  Finally, we eliminate all firms with less than twenty employees from the 
analysis.  Because this cut-off point is above that of any reporting nation, it helps insure 
comparable samples across countries. 
This final procedure reduced the sample size substantially, from 3.4 million to just 
under four hundred thousand firms.  We also repeat the analyses below using the entire 
sample, and find that the results are little changed.  The 394 thousand companies include 
firms from the European Union (Ireland, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) and Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, 
Bosnia H., Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Russia and Ukraine).   In addition, Amadeus contains 
data on companies in Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland.   
A number of EU-directives, which aim to harmonize filing requirements, are 
slowly being implemented.  These result in more information being available in the 
relatively more recent years within the data.  Uniformity is achieved by the standardization 
of accounting information and of industry codifications.  BvD has manually allocated a 
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the trade description for each company allowing activity searching across the database.  All 
national activity codes are cross-referenced to allow cross border searching by a common 
code.  Greater detail on the nature of the Amadeus data and a number of decisions made 
regarding regional and industrial classifications is provided in Appendix B.   
4.1.   Summary Statistics 
Before we start the empirical analysis in the next section, we explore some of the 
initial summary statistics.  In Table 1, we examine summary information by country.   
Panel A summarizes the data for Western Europe.  We tabulate the number of firms in 
1998, the number of regions within the country, the number of industries that have 
companies listed in the national database, the mean and median turnover, mean and median 
assets, as well as mean and median employees for companies included.  The data summary 
shows the wide variability in the number of companies represented.  For example, we only 
have data on 154 companies in Luxembourg and 152 in Iceland.  On the other hand, we 
have information on 95 thousand companies in Germany and 49 thousand companies in 
France.  These differences reflect both the size of the country, the nature of economic 
activity, and the criteria for inclusion in the individual national sample. 
In addition, regional information varies by countries and seems to be weakly 
related to the number of companies included in the data.  For example, France, Germany, 
and the UK have the most regions (26, 28, and 37 respectively) and they also are the three 
largest countries in terms of reporting companies.  In addition, the data within each country 
generally include information on a large number of industries (between 150 and 215).  The 
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data is quite low. 
In Panel B we present the same summary statistics for countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  In most countries, except for Romania, which has 18,000 companies in 
1998, the number of companies reporting is somewhat smaller than we saw in Panel A for 
Western Europe.  When we look at the number of regions in the country, we find that the 
average number of regions per country is quite a bit smaller than Western Europe.  
Data on turnover, assets, and employees demonstrates that the data is highly 
skewed.  Mean values of turnover, assets, and employees are typically substantially larger 
than the median values.  This is not surprising given that we expect a skewed distribution 
of firm size. 
Mean turnover is lowest in Macedonia with a mean turnover of just under $500,000 
and a median turnover of $119,000.  The largest mean turnover is Switzerland with a mean 
of $321 million and a median of $51 million.  Assets show a similar skewness.  The lowest 
average asset levels are again in Macedonia, with the largest average assets are in 
Switzerland.  Finally, dispersion on the number of employees is quite large.  Average sizes 
are relatively small in all countries.  The largest average number of employees is 727 in 
Luxembourg, a country where only 154 companies reported. In Estonia ,the other extreme, 
the average company had 81 employees.  Median numbers of employees are substantially 
lower for all firms.   
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For example, the first industry listed is coal mining.  The Amadeus data has information on 
coal mining companies in 26 countries.  These firms are, generally, quite large, 2,460 
people, although the median is substantially lower, 403.  This likely is a result of a small 
number of very large mining companies and a large number of small firms.  The largest 
numbers of companies fall into the wholesale trade category (44,000 firms) with firms 
listed in every country.  These firms tend to be quite small, having an average of 194 
employees and a median of 44 employees. 
5. Analysis 
  In order to understand the nature of entrepreneurial activity across economies, the 
analysis that follows considers the determinants of entry, exit, average firm size, industrial 
vintage, and the skewness of the firm-size distributions throughout Europe and, 
subsequently, in Western and Eastern Europe separately.  While entry and exit rates 
capture activity in a given year, the other measures reflect longer-run determinants of 
industrial activity.   
5.1.  The Determinants of Entry and Exit 
Studies of entrepreneurial activity have often examined entry and exit rates.  Within 
an economy, higher entry rates have typically been viewed as an indicator of dynamic 
economies.  Our goal is to understand how legal, institutional, and regulatory factors affect 
entry and exit.  Our measures of entry and exit examine that activity within a particular 
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of observation. 
In Table 3, the dependent variable is the rate of entry within each country-industry 
cell for 1998, calculated as the ratio of new firms in 1998 to all firms in 1997.  In all 
specifications presented in Table 3, industry fixed effects are included to control for the 
distinctive nature of industries.  Similarly, GDP per capita is employed in all specifications 
to control for the overall level of economic development.  
Independent variables measure the quality of legal and political institutions.  In 
particular, coefficients are reported for an index of fairness (the inverse of corruption), a 
measure of the strength of property right protection, a formalism index, an index of the 
interference of courts, and a measure of start-up procedures.  Because some of these 
measures are highly correlated with each other, we use only one of these variables in each 
regression.  Thus, each column presents the results of five separate regressions. 
In this first specification of Panel A, negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficients are associated with the fairness index and the property rights index.  The 
measures associated with the judiciary are more mixed.  In nations characterized by higher 
levels of formalism, there is no significant effect, but those characterized by greater 
degrees of interference by the judiciary have significantly lower entry. 
Column 2 incorporates a dummy variable for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  
This measure is consistently negative and significant, suggesting that this region is 
characterized by lower rates of entry.  Inclusion of the CEE dummy has little effect on the 
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the need to separately consider Western Europe and the CEE.  In particular, given the 
recent transitions of many CEE economies, the effects of political, legal, and regulatory 
variables may be more pronounced. 
  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 employ the same empirical framework employed in 
Column 1, but separately estimate entry regressions for Western Europe and the CEE.  
Several results emerge from this separation: 
The dominant pattern is that political, legal, and regulatory institutional structures 
matter far more in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.  All five 
variables are statistically significant in the CEE regressions; while only one (the 
measure of court interference) is in the Western Europe regressions.  This pattern 
reflects the relative importance of the differing institutional environments.  In the 
CEE, differences in institutional environment are clearly first order while in 
Western Europe these considerations seem second order. 
• 
•  Greater fairness and stronger property rights are unambiguously associated with 
higher rates of entry in Central and Eastern Europe.  Similarly, greater judicial 
interference and formalism are associated with lower entry.  Somewhat puzzlingly, 
in nations where more start-up procedures are required, there is more entry as well.  
This reflects the fact the measure of start-up procedures is highly correlated with 
the fairness index.  Not surprisingly, when both measures are used in a multivariate 
regression, the measure of start-up procedures is usually significantly negative. 
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courts is associated with greater entry.   
• 
Taken together, the results indicate that the dynamics of entry are distinctive in Western 
Europe and CEE, with institutional considerations having a far more profound effect on 
entry in Central and Eastern Europe.   
Panel B repeats the analysis.  Instead of estimating ordinary least squares 
regressions, we now employ median regressions, which should be less sensitive to outliers.  
The results are similar to those from before.  Greater fairness and protection of property 
rights are only associated with more entry in Central and Eastern Europe.  The two judicial 
measures are now consistently significant and negative in the CEE, while they are 
significant and positive in the Western Europe.  More start-up procedures are now 
associated with more entry throughout Europe. 
The dynamics that affect entry are also likely to have an impact on the rate of exit 
for a given industry with a country.  Table 4 takes a similar empirical approach to that in 
Table 3 to examine exit in Europe.  Columns 1 and 2 suggest that greater fairness and 
stronger property rights are associated with lower rates of entry, but the significant 
coefficient on the CEE dummy suggests the importance of considering Western Europe 
and CEE separately.  Segregation of the two sub-regions in columns 3 and 4 demonstrates 
that, much like in the case of entry, different dynamics of exit exist in Western Europe and 
the CEE.  Specifically, fairer countries are associated with lower rates of exit throughout 
Europe, but the effect is about thirteen times larger in the CEE.  Nations with stronger 
property rights have significantly lower exit rates, but only in Eastern Europe.  Finally, 
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in Western Europe while no pattern is seen in the CEE.  Results are similar in the median 
regressions in Panel B. 
These patterns are consistent with those seen in the analysis of entry above.  The 
institutional environment appears to matter more in Central and Eastern Europe.  A 
consistent pattern appears in these nations, with stronger property rights and greater 
fairness being associated with a more favorable environment for entrepreneurs (more entry 
and less exit).  The results of our political, legal, and regulatory variables in Western 
Europe are far less consistent and are more difficult to understand.  It appears that there is 
no consistent effect of these institutional variables on entry and exit.  It may be the case 
that other factors – distinctive levels of human capital investment, for example – matter 
much more in more mature economies. 
5.2.   The Determinants of Average Firm Size 
Average firm size offers another perspective on the dynamics of firm growth by not 
emphasizing entry and exit in one year, but by considering a snapshot of overall industrial 
activity.  As noted above, greater fairness and stronger property rights are associated in the 
CEE countries with greater entry and lower exit.  This pattern may lead to either larger or 
smaller average firm size.   
Table 5 considers the determinants of average firm size, employing the same 
empirical framework as we did for entry and exit.  Once again, the dependent variable is 
the average firm size for firms within a given industry in a particular country.  As with 
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without a CEE dummy.  In both specifications, fairer countries and those with stronger 
property rights are associated with smaller firms.  Lower levels of legal formalism, greater 
levels of interference by the courts, and more start-up procedures are associated with larger 
average firm size.   
These results, however, differ when we consider Western Europe and CEE 
separately.  Specifically, higher levels of fairness and stronger property rights are 
associated with smaller average firm size in CEE.  This result is consistent with the 
analysis above: the institutional environment appears to matter critically in creating a 
favorable atmosphere for entrepreneurship in Central and Eastern Europe.   
The results in Western Europe are far smaller in magnitude.  Moreover, they 
suggest that nations with greater fairness are associated with larger, not smaller, firms.  As 
before, the results for the legal variables are different in sign: lower levels of legal 
formalism and greater levels of interference by the courts are associated with larger firm 
size in both sets of nations.  The results on columns 7 and 8—when we estimate median 
regressions—are quite similar.  Once again, we find that the institutional factors matter 
more for entrepreneurial activity in CEE, but have much weaker effects in Western 
Europe. 
5.3    The Determinants of Industrial Vintage 
As discussed in Section 3, the measure of industrial vintage offers a summary 
measure of industrial activity that integrates average firm size with measures of age.   
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industry output.  This measure may be closely correlated with average firm age, or may be 
quite distinct, if institutional variables affect firm growth patterns differently in various 
nations. 
As above, the analysis of industrial vintage presented in Table 6 considers the 
effects of fairness, property rights protection, legal variables and startup procedures on the 
relative importance of young firms to industrial activity.  The analysis presented here 
employs a measure of vintage based on employees, given the greater consistently with 
which this measure is reported.  Unreported analyses using vintage measures based on 
turnover and assets are, however, not significantly different, as are those using different 
weighting schemes.  We once again use industry-country pairs as our unit of analysis. 
The first two columns of Table 6 consider the overall pooled European sample with 
and without the presence of a CEE dummy.  Greater fairness is associated with a higher 
vintage, while results for protection of property rights is inconsistent.  More interference in 
the courts and less formalism are also associated with a higher vintage.  When we look at 
the sets of nations separately, greater fairness and stronger property rights are associated 
with higher vintage in both of the two regions.  In Western Europe, greater formalism is 
associated with lower vintage.  In CEE nations, greater inference with the courts is 
associated with higher vintage.  The results are similar when we estimate median 
regressions. 
What do the distinctive results on vintage and average size indicate?  As noted 
before, in CEE nations, greater fairness is associated with more entry and less exit.  When 
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effect holds when we look at vintage.  This suggests that while fairer nations, particularly 
in Central and Eastern Europe, are not only associated with higher rates of entry, but that 
fairer countries allow the surviving firms to grow large.  In general, the distinction between 
the results on vintage suggest two things: the inadequacy of any one measure at capturing 
the nature of entrepreneurial activity and the importance of institutional factors in 
influencing both the birth of firms and their transition into older, larger firms. 
5.4.   Skewness of the Firm Size Distribution 
Finally, we turn to the effect of the institutional environment on the distribution of 
firm sizes.  As noted in Section 2, Cooley and Quadrini (2002) and Cabral and Mata 
(2003) argue that in the presence of capital constraints, the firm size distribution will be 
skewed.  In this section, we examine the distribution of firm size across various industries, 
following the same approach as above. 
Figures 1 through 3 provide a graphical preview of the results.  Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of firm size in Western Europe, with the number of firms plotted against the 
logarithm of sales.  The overall distribution is skewed, with a skewness of 0.87.  When we 
break down the distribution by firm age, we find that the distribution of firms under 10 
years of age are the most highly skewed and that skewness decreases with age.  Figure 2 
provides a similar representation for Central and Eastern Europe.  The comparison between 
the regions is instructive.  First, the overall distribution is more highly skewed, with a 
skewness of 1.18.  Moreover, when we break down the distribution by firm age, we find 
that firms under 10 years of age are even more highly skewed and that firms that are more 
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Figure 3, we provide a similar analysis for one country - Great Britain, a country in 
Western Europe with a highly developed capital market.  Not only is the overall 
distribution much less skewed (0.37), but the differences in skewness by cohort are much 
less pronounced. 
These figures motivate the analyses reported in Tables 7 and 8.  The dependent 
variable in the first table is the skewness of the firm size distribution in each industry in 
every sample country.  In the latter one, we employ the difference between the skewness of 
the distribution of firms below the median age and those above this threshold.  Once again, 
each industry-country pair is employed as a distinct observation. 
When we examine the level of skewness in Table 7, we find that nations with 
greater fairness and stronger property rights are associated with less skewness.  Similarly, 
firms with a higher level of formalism are associated with more skewness.  The results 
regarding fairness and property rights, however, stem exclusively from the CEE nations in 
the sample.  No significant effects are seen in the Western Europe.  In both sets of nations, 
more formalism is associated with greater skewness.  More judicial interference is 
associated with less skewness, but only in Western Europe.  The results are very similar 
when we estimate median regressions in Panel B. 
Table 8 examines the difference in the skewness of the size distribution in 
particular industries for firms that are below the median age compared to firms that are 
above the median age.  Greater fairness reduces the difference between the skewness of the 
size distribution for younger firms compared to the skewness of the size distribution for 
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where institutions are less fair and property rights weak, the presence of capital constraints 
may lead to a particularly skewed distribution for younger firms, who are less likely to be 
able to finance all positive net present value investment opportunities from internally 
generated cash flows.   
6.   Conclusion 
  This paper seeks to demonstrate the effects of institutional constraints on the real 
activities of firms, with a focus on entrepreneurship.  These firms are of interest for two 
reasons.  First, entrepreneurial firms in many respects represent testing grounds for 
scholars interested in how frictions can affects the workings of companies and markets.  
Second, encouraging entrepreneurship is of intense interest to policymakers. 
Understanding the critical links between institutional development and entrepreneurial 
activity is critical, especially in emerging and transitioning economies. 
  Our focus on political, legal, and regulatory factors is motivated by work that has 
demonstrated their importance to the development of capital markets.  The results suggest 
a strong influence of the institutional environment in shaping firm dynamics.  The results 
regarding entry, exit, firm size, vintage, and skewness tell a consistent story.  Greater 
fairness and stronger protection of property rights are critically important in encouraging 
both the emergence and growth of new enterprises, particularly in emerging markets.  The 
results are much less clear-cut in Western Europe.  To us, this suggests that in more 
developed economies, these institutional effects may be second order to the many other 
unobserved factors that may affect entrepreneurial dynamics.  Examples of such 
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Hubbard (2002) and Cullen and Gordon (2003)), labor market conditions (Gromb and 
Scharfstein (2001)), and the supply of new ideas.   
Our results suggest several avenues for further research.  First, while studies of 
entrepreneurship typically emphasize entry, our results suggest that there may exist another 
critical point in firm maturation where institutions impact the ability of firms to graduate 
into larger firms.  As a consequence, entry rates alone are an inadequate measure of 
entrepreneurial dynamism.  The identification of the determinants of how institutions 
impact this maturation process must be better understood. Second, the inability of our 
institutional variables to explain many of the patterns seen in Western Europe raises the 
question of what factors influence entrepreneurial activity in more developed markets.   
Finally, establishing the links between these measures of entrepreneurship and broader 
economic growth remains a central open question in this literature. 
It is our hope to continue to explore these important issues in a European setting.  
The high degree of disclosure of information on privately held firms in Europe, in 
combination with the broad scope of the Amadeus dataset, will hopefully provide greater 
insight into these questions of entrepreneurial dynamics.    
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  35Appendix A: Information Providers by Country 
 
Albertina data 
Nad Boticem 593/8, 102 00 
Praha 10 
Czech Republic 
Tel. : 420 (2) 71960166-9 
Fax : 420 (2) 71960161 
 
CFI Online 




Tel. : 353 (1) 664 1111 
Fax : 353 (1) 664 1100 
 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Romania 
4, Expozitiei Bdv., Sector 1 
Bucharest 783341 
Romania 
Tel. : 40 (1) 223 08 93 
Fax : 40 (1) 223 16 70 
 
COFACE SCRL 
5 Quai Jayr - BP 9063 
69255 Lyon 
France 
Tel. : 33 (4) 72 85 10 00 
Fax : 33 (4) 72 20 10 50 
 
COFACE MOPE 
Rua de Santa Marta 43 E/F, 4° 
1150 Lisboa 
Portugal 
Tel. : 351 (1) 352 29 96 
Fax : 351 (1) 352 04 18 
 
CreditInform AS 
P.O. Box 5275, Majorstua 
N-0303 Oslo 
Norway 
Tel. : 47 (22) 93 20 00 





Tel. : 386 (61) 125 9065 
Fax : 386 (61) 125 9130 
 
Jordans 




Tel. : 44 (117) 923 06 00 
Fax : 44 (117) 923 00 63 
 
Købmandstandens Oplysningsbureau 
Gammel Mønt 4 
1117 København 
Denmark 
Tel. : 45 - 33 11 12 00 






Tel. : 372 (6) 659 9600 
Fax : 372 (6) 665 9601 
 
MID Group Ltd. 
Bulevar Lenjina 20/IV ulaz B 
11070 Novi Beograd 
Yugoslavia 
Tel. : 381 (11) 699 905 
Fax : 381 (11) 696 059 
 
National Bank of Belgium 
14, boulevard de Berlaimont 
1000 Brussels 
Belgium 
Tel. : 32 (2) 221 21 11 
Fax : 32 (2) 221 31 17 
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Creditreform Bulgaria 
zh.k. Ilinden, bl. 129, vh. B 
1309 Sofia 
Bulgaria 
Tel. : 359 (2) 929 3993 




ul. Baruna Trenka 13 
10000 Zagreb 
Croatia 
Tel. : 385 (1) 45 777 68 
Fax : 385 (1) 45 731 12 
 
Intercredit Budapest 
Kálvária tér  
71089  Budapest 
Hungary 
Tel. : 36 (1) 303 9300 








20090 Vimodrone (Milano) 
Italy 
Tel. : 39 (2) 250100.1 
Fax : 39 (2) 250 07070 
 
Patikimo Verslo Sistema 
P.O. Box 2878 
2000 Vilnius 
Lithuania 
Tel. : 370 (2) 22 41 33 





Tel. : 46 (8) 670 90 00 
Fax : 46 (8) 661 48 32 
 




Tel. : 49 (2131) 109 10 
Fax : 49 (2131) 109 8000 
 
 
  37Appendix B: Characteristics of the Sample 
B.1 Company-Level Data 
The Amadeus data contains over 130 variables of information for the companies 
within the data set.  Company profile variables include the geographical location, 
identification number, legal form, etc.  In addition, industry codes are included.  Because 
of differences across countries, there are more than 15 different industry codes and its 
corresponding descriptions (see next section for greater details on industry codes).  The 
data also provides information on the firms’ managers and auditors.  Typically, the data 
would include information on up to 10 managers.   In addition, standard balance sheet and 
income statement items are tracked.  The exact financial information captured differs 
depending upon the data collected within the country. 
One of the interesting aspects of the data is information on ownership and 
subsidiaries.  These data include owners’ and subsidiary’s identification number, country, 
turnover, date of acquisition, and percentage of ownership (up to 10 owners and 
subsidiaries per company).  Ultimate holding company data is also available for some 
companies.  Depending upon the country, these data is available for both public and 
private companies. 
B.2. Types of Companies 
The inclusion criteria used by Bureau van Dijk Amadeus differs by country, relying 
on individual national filing requirements for the core data.  State-owned companies as 
well as privately owned firms are included.  Banks and insurance companies are not 
included.  Two different types of companies are included in the Amadeus data.  Type 1 
companies are those whose capital is divided into shares which can be offered to the 
general public and whose members are only liable for its debts to the extent of any amount 
unpaid on their shares.  Type 2 companies are those whose capital is divided into shares 
that cannot be offered to the general public.  The liability of its members is limited to the 
amount of their shares.  Finally, the database includes information on other entities 
including partnerships (IHG, KG, K/S, Ky, Kb, SNC, SC, G,bH &Co, KG, SapA, Sas, Snc, 
ANS, K/s, HB, KB) and sole proprietorships (SURL, EVBA, Sole proprietorships, OE, 
EE), and cooperatives.  Table A-1 illustrates a breakdown of Type 1 and Type 2 companies 
by country. 
B.3. Industry Classifications 
Our analysis exploits industry level information in the data across countries.  As 
such, we need to have common industry definitions within the data.  All firms in the 
Amadeus data have an identifier used by the national body collecting the data.  Typically, 
these codes are unique to the individual country.  In addition to the national industry codes 
assigned by the information provider in each country, detailed uniform 7-digit CSO 
activity codes are assigned by Bureau van Dijk to all of the companies in the database. The 
CSO activity codes have been assigned to each company from the standard list of 8,000 
activities produced by the British Central Statistical Office (CSO). All the codes  (NAF, 
ATECO, WZ, SIC-UK, BIK, ISIC, SIC-US, etc.) are cross-referenced to the CSO activity 
code.  In addition, NACE codes (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the 
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European Community) are the basis for many of the new updated and more harmonized 
national codes. All countries in the EU are now obligated to create new classifications 
whose first three digits are based on NACE 1.  
Bureau Van Dijk has provided a spreadsheet with conversion codes between the 
various industry classifications.  Also, Amadeus online allows users to obtain all the 
corresponding codes to a particular code.  
B.4. Ownership and Subsidiary Data 
Bureau Van Dijk merges ownership data that it receives from all its information 
providers into one large database.  This information is then analyzed to identify each cross 
border holding/subsidiary link by the national identification number of the companies 
involved.  
This means that all subsidiaries that European companies have in countries outside 
Europe that are not reported to the national statistical office do not appear in the subsidiary 
section of the company.  Those subsidiaries overseas disclose information to their national 
office.  Thus, if a French company has one subsidiary in Spain and two in Canada, the 
Spanish Information provider will report data on its French parent company that will be 
then linked to the French company as a subsidiary.  Because Amadeus has no information 
provider from Canada, there is no way to find out if the French company has a Canadian 
subsidiary unless the company reports it. 
Ownership and subsidiary data are dated corresponding with the latest statement 
available for the parent company.  Ownership and subsidiary data usually include the name 
and identification number of both the parent and the subsidiary, which can be then tracked 
within the database, percentage of ownership (direct and total), turnover, and date of 
acquisition.  If a company has more than 10 owners or subsidiaries, only the largest 10 will 
be reported.  There is also information on ultimate shareholder, including identification 
number, country, type, and turnover. 
B.5. Regional Information 
The data by country is further divided into regions.  The regions within the 
Amadeus dataset are based upon the definitions of regions defined in the European 
Commission’s Eurostat.  Eurostat’s regional statistics cover the principal aspects of the 
economic and social life, such as demography, economic accounts, employment, 
unemployment, and so forth.  Eurostat attempts to group together population or places with 
sufficient similarities to comprise a logical unit for administrative purposes. Eurostat, in 
collaboration with the other Commission departments, set up the Nomenclature of 
Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS) at the beginning of the 1970s as a single, coherent 
system for dividing up the European Union’s territory. 
As of yet, the NUTS classification has no specific legal basis, i.e. there is no 
regulation that sets rules for compiling and updating the system of regional reporting and 
boundaries.  These matters have been settled so far by “gentlemen’s agreements” between 
the Member States and Eurostat, sometimes after long and difficult negotiations.  The 
NUTS scheme is then published by Eurostat (the latest edition came out in 1999).  NUTS 
is a hierarchical classification scheme, with three levels of aggregation referred to as 
NUTS Levels 1, 2, and 3 (the finest partition). Figure 2: Firm Size Distributions for Central and Eastern Europe, Overall and by Cohort, 1998
Figure 1: Firm Size Distributions for Western Europe, Overall and by Cohort, 1998
Note: The left panel depicts the overall firm size distribution for Western Europe in 1998.  The right panel depicts the size distribution by 
cohort.  Summary statistics for the distributions are provided at the bottom of the panels.
Note: The left panel depicts the overall firm size distribution for Central and Eastern Europe in 1998.  The right panel depicts the size 
distribution by cohort.  Summary statistics for the distributions are provided at the bottom of the panels.Note: The left panel depicts the overall firm size distribution for the United Kingdom in 1998.  The right panel depicts the size distribution 
by cohort.  Summary statistics for the distributions are provided at the bottom of the panels.
Figure 3: Firm Size Distributions for the United Kingdom, Overall and by Cohort, 1998Austria 7,380 9 53 $25,442 $5,655  $159,313  $31,384  129 45
Belgium 11,273 11 55 $51,272 $10,384 $43,422  $4,461  127 39
Denmark 8,304 1 53 $65,271 $18,047 $26,905  $4,411  174 43
Finland 4,613 6 52 $61,280 $7,062  $53,479 $3,937  264 48
France 49,434 27 55 $46,304 $6,524  $43,161 $3,285  231 42
Germany 95,315 44 56 $62,490 $6,251  $712,887  $109,763  264 45
Greece 5,438 13 53 $14,193 $3,577  $16,761 $3,524  109 42
Iceland 152 1 30 $47,689 $21,916 $52,962 $17,369  216 125
Ireland 913 2 47 $124,787 $27,979 $82,630 $10,632  381 87
Italy 38,556 20 55 $35,619 $7,424  $39,459 $6,135  287 41
Luxembourg 154 1 31 $250,100 $34,643  $365,893 $20,420  775 154
Netherlands 10,760 12 55 $129,378 $7,019  $90,544 $8,764  467 81
Norway 6,842 1 54 $30,008 $5,765  $27,356 $2,738  97 38
Portugal 2,751 7 52 $30,601 $4,649  $39,677 $3,458  221 53
Spain 30,882 17 55 $23,447 $4,145  $22,175 $2,829  526 39
Sweden 13,604 8 54 $50,904 $7,644  $57,971 $3,873  605 42
Switzerland 6,703 1 52 $321,396 $50,592  $906,497  $128,137  473 50
United Kingdom 50,099 37 56 $87,030  $13,350  $128,815  $6,744  420 79
Bulgaria 4,484 6 55 $3,725 $592  $3,412 $409 248 118
Croatia 1,280 1 49 $17,521 $6,619  $43,278  $11,828  334 158
Czechoslovakia 4,370 6 54 $14,657 $3,868  $15,890 $3,049  257 100
Estonia 2,939 1 51 $2,928 $918  $2,062 $411  81 40
Hungary 2,852 7 53 $24,842 $6,317  $16,924 $3,078  438 130
Latvia 1,326 1 50 $5,277 $1,955 $4,702 $1,086  188 100
Lithuania 336 1 38 $9,646 $3,813 $6,699 $2,165  356 127
Macedonia 35 1 19 $487 $119  $1,424 $890 651 339
Poland 9,338 16 54 $22,968 $6,951  $18,379 $3,675  377 148
Romania 13,762 8 56 $2,940 $636  $2,810 $377 234 51
Russia 9,059 1 54 $41,985 $3,034  $101,929 $5,615 1,105 347
Slovakia 415 4 48 $19,456 $4,531  $20,079 $3,898  353 124
Ukraine 343 1 44 . . $24,331 $5,663  532 309
Yugoslavia 296 1 41 $14,362 $3,197  $30,280 $5,985  427 186
Panel A: Eurozone
Note: The first three columns of the table provide the number of firms and regions by country and the number of industries represented within those countries.  The next six columns 
provide mean and median revenues, assets and employment by country for those firms.  The top panel features countries from the Eurozone and the bottom panel features countries from the 
Central and Eastern Europe.  The sample is restricted to those firms with more than twenty employees.



















Revenues       
($ thousands)
Mean Assets    
($ thousands)Mining-Coal 360 26 85 $207,486 $15,353  $368,356 $25,962  2,460 403
Oil and Gas Extraction 3,129 29 221 $179,577  $2,400  $254,009  $2,353  558 64
Mining-Uranium 1,661 29 172 $11,712 $1,379 $7,035  $855  221 43
Mining-Metal 2,803 28 187 $6,271 $1,613  $10,506  $669  145 43
Mining-Other 2,164 29 239 $46,307 $4,859  $99,505 $3,892  275 49
Food 18,326 32 263 $55,931 $7,492  $45,637 $4,881  344 82
Tobacco 232 26 80 $425,501 $34,152  $323,605 $22,390  869 280
Textiles-manufacture 7,377 31 238 $18,620 $6,066  $15,812 $4,772  223 70
Clothing 4,386 30 228 $19,721 $4,000  $18,277 $2,548  226 70
Leather 2,359 31 195 $19,955 $5,363  $13,726 $3,401  214 65
Wood 5,466 30 241 $17,761 $5,399  $17,008 $3,670  173 50
Paper 3,535 30 233 $61,953 $11,443 $71,119  $8,605  305 80
Publishing 9,252 32 244 $37,145 $6,422  $37,673 $4,580  208 51
Refined  Petroleum 515 28 155 $550,169 $33,269  $459,250 $29,958  696 101
Chemicals 8,047 32 251 $123,220 $16,677  $138,828 $13,123  1,042 89
Rubber 5,481 31 246 $37,799 $10,628 $35,479  $7,422  319 77
Glass, Ceramics 7,660 32 251 $31,235 $6,819  $39,060 $5,402  291 59
Metals-Basic 4,725 31 242 $90,101 $12,641  $103,791  $9,928  620 90
Metals-Fabricated 20,911 31 257 $16,491 $4,781  $14,322 $3,335  228 47
Machinery and Equipment 16,317 31 250 $49,163  $8,548  $43,631  $6,587  307 70
Computers, Office  1,204 25 164 $103,700  $12,006  $89,705  $8,596  370 74
Electrical Machinery 9,045 31 248 $30,374 $4,563  $27,562 $3,519  221 46
Telecommunication- 3,141 29 216 $95,782 $10,693 $73,364  $7,741  449 82
Optical,  medical 4,031 31 221 $64,782 $8,524  $74,735 $8,393  381 70
Motor Vehicles- 3,035 29 235 $313,034  $12,059  $309,375  $8,557  1,331 100
Transport-Other 1,825 31 213 $79,710 $8,957  $102,597 $8,082  1,090 99
Furniture 8,079 29 247 $15,576 $5,382  $10,477 $3,442  138 50
Recycling 568 22 128 $8,729 $3,109 $8,524 $1,973  98 42
Electricity, gas, hot water 2,297 29 203 $275,874 $22,356  $554,410 $46,176  1,924 154
Water-Collection and  680 23 156 $61,082  $5,939  $206,458  $11,936  416 117
Construction 37,311 31 263 $18,745 $3,912  $24,126 $2,606  157 42
Motor  vehicles-sale,repair  15,889 32 259 $38,636 $12,502 $19,622  $4,626  97 40
Wholesale 44,714 32 263 $61,956 $11,900 $30,198  $6,025  194 44
Retail 18,661 32 261 $83,475 $7,382  $42,077 $2,706  716 43
Hotels and restaurants 9,211 31 257 $16,643  $2,898  $25,736  $2,316  248 46
Land  transport 10,731 30 253 $26,667 $4,384  $50,015 $2,705  338 47
Water  transport 808 28 121 $103,553 $15,414  $123,762 $18,005  549 120
Air  transport 405 28 101 $323,677 $19,890  $325,729 $17,306  1,412 238
Auxiliary transport 7,162 31 240 $51,196 $9,377  $51,267 $5,326  216 56
Postal  and  1,333 30 170 $358,397 $14,125  $523,103 $12,874  2,337 112
Financial 4,504 25 166 $130,636 $7,384  $512,289 $8,923  630 65
Auxiliary financial 1,403 26 158 $197,666 $14,001  $988,963 $21,921  749 66
Real estate 5,210 28 224 $63,858  $8,179  $119,825  $11,265  617 48
Renting machinery 1,335 25 189 $43,078 $7,618  $71,257 $7,311  179 42
Computer-services 6,470 30 215 $39,241 $6,893  $22,120 $4,122  199 49
Research and Development 1,027 27 163 $20,399 $4,546  $34,512 $6,079  309 138
Other Business Activities 26,774 32 254 $63,868  $5,863  $79,469  $4,212  433 63
Public Administration 208 19 75 $20,222  $1,873  $27,462  $812  453 64
Education 1,992 26 187 $8,420 $3,117  $10,418 $2,392  136 58
Health and social work 6,273 27 224 $14,181  $3,645  $10,620  $2,436  218 68
Sewage and sanitation 1,992 27 214 $17,637  $4,111  $28,718  $2,303  173 58
Professional  organizations 364 19 94 $26,270 $4,440  $30,793 $4,181  138 42
Recreation,  cultural 3,557 31 232 $40,637 $5,138  $36,886 $4,371  281 53
Other  services 3,115 25 206 $4,809 $2,557 $4,249 $1,956  74 42
Private  households 5 3 5 $2,718 $1,479 $3,758 $2,331  59 37
Missing 24,943 31 230 $13,444 $3,523  $20,217 $2,535  213 36
Table 2























Note: The first three columns of the table provide the number of firms and countries by industry and the number of regions represented within those 
industries.  The next six columns provide mean and median revenues, assets and employment by country for those firms.  The sample is restricted to those 
firms with more than twenty employees.Eurozone CEE Eurozone CEE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.7370
  -0.4610 -0.7222 0.9781
** 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0033 0.0543
***
(1.0179) (0.7774) (1.0835) (0.3809) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0203)
1518 1518 945 573 1518 1518 945 573
2.8788 3.4709 6.9379 -8.7470
*** 0.0051 0.0046 0.0368
*** -0.2590
***
(4.8328) (5.4512) (6.9246) (2.3772) (0.0125) (0.0095) (0.0066) (0.0567)





*** -0.0168 -0.0190 0.0562
*** -0.2881
***
(0.0207) (0.0199) (0.0126) (0.0332) (0.0160) (0.0246) (0.0131) (0.0463)
863 863 389 474 863 863 389 474






(1.2827) (1.3797) (1.6358) (0.4961) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0128)
1396 1396 877 519 1396 1396 877 519





(5.3976) (4.0308) (5.9479) (0.0272) (0.0087) (0.0105) (0.0125) (0.0390)
1213 1213 945 268 1213 1213 945 268
CEE dummy? N Y N N N Y
** NN
Industry Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capita controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Protection of Property 
Rights 
All europe All europe
Note:  The table presents the results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable is the rate of entry in 1998 as defined in the text.   In the left panel, specifications are estimated via 
ordinary least squares and the right panel median regressions are presented.  In each panel, the first two columns employ all of Europe while the the third and fourth column restrict attention to the 
Eurozone and CEE, respectively.  In the second column of both panels, a dummy variable set equal to one for CEE observations is also included.   In all specifications, industry fixed effects and gdp 
per capita countrols are employed.  The independent variables are the fairness index, the formalism index, a measure of interference by courts, a measure of start-up procedures, and a measure of 
property rights protection as described more fully in the text.  Each cell provides the coefficient on independent variable, the standard error and the number of observations for that regression.  In 
OLS specifications, the standard errors are heteroskedastiicty-consistent and in the median regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped.   
Table 3
Determinants of Entry in Europe, 1998





OLS Univariates Median UnivariatesEurozone CEE Eurozone CEE










(0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0170) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0058)




*** 0.0136 0.0029 0.0037
** 0.0097
*** -0.0009
(0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0143) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0072)








(0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0061) (0.0433) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0173)








(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0065) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0034)









(0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0192) (0.0036) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0063)
1169 1169 913 256 1169 1169 913 256
CEE dummy? N Y N N N Y N N
Industry Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capita controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 4
Determinants of Exit in Europe, 1998




OLS Univariates Median Univariates
Fairness Index
Protection of Property 
Rights 
All europe All europe
Note:  The table presents the results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable is the rate of exit  in 1998 as defined in the text.   In the left panel, specifications are estimated via ordinary 
least squares and the right panel median regressions are presented.  In each panel, the first two columns employ all of Europe while the the third and fourth column restrict attention to the Eurozone 
and CEE, respectively.  In the second column of both panels, a dummy variable set equal to one for CEE observations is also included.   In all specifications, industry fixed effects and gdp per capita 
countrols are employed.  The independent variables are the fairness index, the formalism index, a measure of interference by courts, a measure of start-up procedures, and a measure of property rights 
protection as described more fully in the text.  Each cell provides the coefficient on independent variable, the standard error and the number of observations for that regression.  In OLS specifications, 
the standard errors are heteroskedastiicty-consistent and in the median regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped.Eurozone CEE Eurozone CEE





*** 0.0015 0.0171 0.0388
*** -0.3017
***
(0.0189) (0.0167) (0.0147) (0.0407) (0.0161) (0.0105) (0.0128) (0.0508)










(0.0328) (0.0331) (0.0336) (0.0638) (0.0280) (0.0392) (0.0505) (0.0895)










(0.0634) (0.0636) (0.0562) (0.1112) (0.0937) (0.0865) (0.0344) (0.1426)




*** 0.0011 0.0021 -0.0064 0.0873
***
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0137) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0167)





*** -0.0807 0.0955 -0.3175
***
(0.0426) (0.0413) (0.0485) (0.0651) (0.0592) (0.0544) (0.0367) (0.0717)
1279 1279 918 361 1279 1279 918 361
CEE dummy? N Y N N N Y N N
Industry Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capita controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Protection of Property 
Rights 
All europe All europe
Note:  The table presents the results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable is the average firm size, measured by employees,  in 1998 as defined in the text.   In the left panel, 
specifications are estimated via ordinary least squares and the right panel median regressions are presented.  In each panel, the first two columns employ all of Europe while the the third and fourth 
column restrict attention to the Eurozone and CEE, respectively.  In the second column of both panels, a dummy variable set equal to one for CEE observations is also included.   In all specifications, 
industry fixed effects and gdp per capita countrols are employed.  The independent variables are the fairness index, the formalism index, a measure of interference by courts, a measure of start-up 
procedures, and a measure of property rights protection as described more fully in the text.  Each cell provides the coefficient on independent variable, the standard error and the number of 
observations for that regression.  In OLS specifications, the standard errors are heteroskedastiicty-consistent and in the median regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped.   
Table 5
Determinants of Size in Europe, 1998





OLS Univariates Median UnivariatesEurozone CEE Eurozone CEE










(0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0385) (0.0133) (0.0182) (0.0207) (0.0403)




*** -0.0938 -0.0354 -0.1439
*** -0.1582
*** 0.0574
(0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0791) (0.0421) (0.0509) (0.0396) (0.0980)









(0.0572) (0.0533) (0.0687) (0.0751) (0.0950) (0.1005) (0.0652) (0.1499)





* 0.0129 0.0088 0.0597
***
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0149) (0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0061) (0.0179)






*** -0.0578 0.0497 0.0057
(0.0430) (0.0389) (0.0511) (0.0464) (0.0547) (0.0598) (0.0522) (0.1125)
1272 1272 912 360 1272 1272 912 360
CEE dummy N Y N N N Y N N
Industry Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capital controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 6
Determinants of Vintage in Europe, 1998




OLS Univariates Median Univariates
Fairness Index
Protection of Property 
Rights 
All europe All europe
Note:  The table presents the results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable is the measure of vintage, measured by employees,  in 1998 as defined in the text.   In the left panel, 
specifications are estimated via ordinary least squares and the right panel median regressions are presented.  In each panel, the first two columns employ all of Europe while the the third and fourth 
column restrict attention to the Eurozone and CEE, respectively.  In the second column of both panels, a dummy variable set equal to one for CEE observations is also included.   In all specifications, 
industry fixed effects and gdp per capita countrols are employed.  The independent variables are the fairness index, the formalism index, a measure of interference by courts, a measure of start-up 
procedures, and a measure of property rights protection as described more fully in the text.  Each cell provides the coefficient on independent variable, the standard error and the number of observations 
for that regression.  In OLS specifications, the standard errors are heteroskedastiicty-consistent and in the median regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped.   Eurozone CEE Eurozone CEE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0261 -0.0377
** -0.0007 -0.1693
*** -0.0036 -0.0048 0.0171 -0.139298
**
(0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0417) (0.0184) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0602)








(0.0309) (0.0326) (0.0330) (0.0845) (0.0265) (0.0514) (0.0535) (0.0900)
1361 1361 858 503 1361 1361 858 503
0.0561 -0.0002 -0.4227
*** 0.0308 0.0076 -0.0118 -0.4374
*** 0.1636
(0.0610) (0.0589) (0.0672) (0.0888) (0.0749) (0.0637) (0.0534) (0.1249)
823 823 374 449 823 823 374 449
-0.0045 -0.0056 -0.0179
*** 0.0515
*** -0.0023 -0.0049 -0.0157
*** 0.0762
***
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0168) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0126)







(0.0394) (0.0409) (0.0492) (0.0645) (0.0359) (0.0250) (0.0612) (0.0853)
1183 1183 858 325 1183 1183 858 325
CEE dummy N Y N N N Y N N
Industry Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capital controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 7
Determinants of Skewness in Europe, 1998





OLS Univariates Median Univariates
Protection of Property 
Rights 
All europe All europe
Note:  The table presents the results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable is the skewness of the firm-size distribution  in 1998 as defined in the text.   In the left panel, specifications 
are estimated via ordinary least squares and the right panel median regressions are presented.  In each panel, the first two columns employ all of Europe while the the third and fourth column restrict 
attention to the Eurozone and CEE, respectively.  In the second column of both panels, a dummy variable set equal to one for CEE observations is also included.   In all specifications, industry fixed 
effects and gdp per capita countrols are employed.  The independent variables are the fairness index, the formalism index, a measure of interference by courts, a measure of start-up procedures, and a 
measure of property rights protection as described more fully in the text.  Each cell provides the coefficient on independent variable, the standard error and the number of observations for that regression. 
In OLS specifications, the standard errors are heteroskedastiicty-consistent and in the median regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped.   Eurozone CEE Eurozone CEE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0355 -0.0273 0.0327 -0.2630
*** 0.0118 0.0376 0.0754
*** -0.3028
***
(0.0227) (0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0578) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0191) (0.0712)










(0.0451) (0.0460) (0.0482) (0.1090) (0.0425) (0.0332) (0.0709) (0.1591)
1253 1253 804 449 1253 1253 804 449
0.0495 0.0483 -0.3407
*** 0.1656 0.0569 0.0764 -0.4842
*** 0.2071
(0.0840) (0.0839) (0.0876) (0.1499) (0.1045) (0.0893) (0.1400) (0.2096)









(0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0077) (0.0260) (0.0073) (0.0104) (0.0097) (0.0294)





*** -0.0947 0.0663 -0.2212
(0.0565) (0.0593) (0.0702) (0.0979) (0.0694) (0.0721) (0.0897) (0.1439)
1089 1089 804 285 1089 1089 804 285
CEE dummy N Y N N N Y N N
Industry Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capital controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 8
Determinants of Differential Skewness in Europe, 1998





OLS Univariates Median Univariates
Protection of Property 
Rights 
All europe All europe
Note:  The table presents the results of univariate regressions where the dependent variable is the difference in skewness of the firm-size distributions for firms above and below the median age  in 1998 as 
defined in the text.   In the left panel, specifications are estimated via ordinary least squares and the right panel median regressions are presented.  In each panel, the first two columns employ all of Europe 
while the the third and fourth column restrict attention to the Eurozone and CEE, respectively.  In the second column of both panels, a dummy variable set equal to one for CEE observations is also 
included.   In all specifications, industry fixed effects and gdp per capita countrols are employed.  The independent variables are the fairness index, the formalism index, a measure of interference by courts, 
a measure of start-up procedures, and a measure of property rights protection as described more fully in the text.  Each cell provides the coefficient on independent variable, the standard error and the 
number of observations for that regression.  In OLS specifications, the standard errors are heteroskedastiicty-consistent and in the median regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped.   